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Social Welfare and Protection 
for Economic Growth and Social 
Stability—China’s Experience
LI Bingqin
China’s Communist Party has directed the country’s welfare system 
to maintain party authority amidst changing political, social, and 
economic circumstances. Welfare during the years of central planning 
was comprehensively provided either directly by the state or through 
co-operatives with a clear rural-urban divide. Following the death of 
Mao Zedong, the Chinese economy was liberalised and capitalists began 
to be accepted as members of the Party. From the late 1970s until the 
early 2000s, welfare provisions from state and business enterprises 
gradually declined even as individuals began bearing ever-growing 
personal responsibility in social assistance. While welfare policy had, 
until the early 2000s, been used to increase economic efficiency, the 
many social problems that attended the Chinese model of development 
soon led Beijing to target welfare policy directly at social well-being. 
Consequently, more recent policy has sought to spread the benefits of 
economic growth more equitably. 
Keywords: welfare; development; labour; rural areas; cities; 
 inequality; social problems
This paper examines the impact of political, social and economic factors 
on the changing welfare scene over the past three decades in China, 
and the consequent implications and limitations. A number of studies suggest 
that welfare reforms in China have been centred on three themes: economic 
growth, social stability and political authority (Croll 1999; Cook and Kwon 
2007). This paper argues that despite changes in welfare paradigms, the 
ways in which the state has responded to welfare needs have not really 
moved away from the core theme of party authority. In different reform 
periods, contributions to party authority have been the outcome of changing 
social and economic contexts. As an authoritarian polity, China is often 
portrayed as a country in which the Communist Party is an almighty force 
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and can dictate everything as it wishes. However, researchers in Chinese 
politics are taking increasing note of the co-existence of different views 
both inside and outside the one-party system. Changes to China’s welfare 
system have not all been imposed in a top-down fashion. Rather, they 
reflect a negotiation between different political ideologies and different 
social groups during the periods concerned. 
Although Chinese officials have been reluctant to make radical changes 
to the political system, there have nevertheless been some political changes 
in the post-Mao era. For example, Deng Xiaoping voluntarily gave up power 
in 1986 but continued to give directions behind the scenes. When Jiang 
Zemin came to power, the emphasis was shifted to collective governing. 
In 2002, a set of new rules was introduced to curtail the possibility of 
long-term dictatorship: 
(1) members of the Standing Committee for the Political Bureau could 
only be in power for no more than two terms; 
(2) they should not be older than 70 when they first come to power; 
and 
(3) no person should work at the same level for more than 15 years. 
This is still a far cry from an electoral democracy, but the office term 
limits rule out the possibility of a leader staying in power indefinitely. What 
is more, with a fixed term, every new leader develops a unique political 
theme to serve as the guiding principle of his term of office, so that he 
will not be considered a pet of his predecessor. The sources of these new 
themes can be found in the ongoing economic and social situation in 
China. Every wave of self reinvention in the past has been the outcome of 
such bargaining processes. The positioning of welfare reform in relation 
to other policies also reflects these negotiations at work. It is therefore 
important to examine the role of welfare reform against the backdrop of 
the interaction between various social and economic factors and resultant 
political changes. 
The following sections of this paper briefly examines the self-reinventions 
of the Party, then discusses the ways in which these were responses to 
prevailing socio-economic changes, and how they helped to achieve 
prosperity and stability in China. The last part of this paper discusses the 
limits of such a system and future challenges.
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Gradual reform as an approach to avoid conflicts 
(pre-1992)
The urban welfare system during the Central Planning era had three 
main principles: guaranteed employment (“iron rice bowl”), egalitarian 
distribution, and cradle-to-grave welfare coverage (Ngok 2010). At the 
same time, rural welfare was based on a different, co-operative system. To 
maintain such a system, the national income had to grow steadily in order 
to support a growing population. The economy indeed grew for several 
years in the 1950s, but this was followed by a series of political campaigns 
by Mao against his rivals, which distracted from the focus on economic 
growth (Weatherley 2006). Today, it is difficult to tell whether the economy 
would have continued to grow had there been no political turmoil. 
Theoretically, the Central Planning system suffered from serious 
problems. First, public ownership cultivated disincentives to improve 
productivity and led to welfare dependency (Leung 1994). Second, the 
egalitarian ideal, when faced with the constraint of resource scarcity, was 
manipulated by officials in favour of party members, people with more 
senior positions, and state sector employees (Bian and Logan 1996). Third, 
the perpetual rural-urban divide cultivated a strong sense of privilege 
among urban residents. The impact of the hùkǒu (户口) system has been so 
profound that resistance to equalising social welfare entitlement among 
urban residents remains strong to this day. 
In the early stages of the welfare reform, the Party was keen not to 
cause strong resentment among the public. There were attempts to radically 
change the welfare system, but whenever there were signs of resistance, 
reforms were put on hold. 
Pre-reform economic situation and the political debates
Many people cite 1978 as the year that economic reforms began after the 
Cultural Revolution. In this year, rural areas began to adopt a household 
responsibility system. More recent studies suggest that reforms had already 
begun in 1975, during which Deng Xiaoping was appointed to clean up 
the mess caused by the Cultural Revolution. The reforms were intended to 
restore the order of central planning, and help the economy recover quickly. 
Unfortunately, Deng was again removed from his position by Mao (Qin 
2008). As shown in Chart 1, the economy had already returned to a track 
of accelerated growth from 1976. When Mao died, there was no political 
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consensus over the direction of reforms. The reformers were faced with 
three choices: continue with central planning, turn to the market, or stay 
somewhere in between. 
Gradual reform as a compromise
Moving the start date of the reform period from 1978 to 1975 has an 
important implication: it helps to show that there was never a clear-cut path 
for the reformers in China, who were unsure how reforms should proceed. 
Some believed that without political turmoil, central planning could have 
worked. The economy’s rapid recovery after the 1975 reforms helped to 
support this argument. Others disagreed with this interpretation. The 
Household Responsibility Reform in rural areas was a bottom-up initiative 
by farmers to rebel against the planning system. Earlier experiments could 
be traced even to the 1950s. In the 1970s, Anhui had already embarked 
on the experiment without permission from the centre. This resulted in 
a serious dispute in Beijing between the pro-market and pro-planning 
factions. Even at the local level, not many provincial leaders supported 
the practice of Anhui. In cities that benefited from the planning system, 
CHArt 1. reFOrMS FrOM 1975 HeLPeD tO iMPrOVe tHe eCONOMiC SituAtiON
Data source: World Databank, http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do
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marketisation was also not necessarily perceived positively. To avoid the 
politically charged violence amongst different factions, seen during the 
Cultural Revolution, a gradual reform approach was introduced in the early 
1980s as a compromise. Reforms would begin in rural areas first; and the 
future of these reforms would depend on outcomes in the rural regions. 
Deng‘s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was to a great extent 
a pragmatic approach to balancing the two conflicting poles of opinions. 
His later handling of the conflicts between the two sides also showed that 
he was not interested in standing firmly on any one side by denouncing 
both complete westernisation and extreme leftist views (Chai 2003).
Breaking away from work unit welfare
By 1978, unemployment had become a serious problem. Rapid population 
growth and poor economic performance had made it difficult to create 
enough jobs for young people in the 1960s and 1970s. Many were sent to 
the countryside to help on farms. When the Cultural Revolution ended, tens 
of millions of people returned to their hometowns. Many of them could 
not find jobs and often turned to alcoholism and violence. Social stability 
was seriously threatened. To tackle this problem, a number of policies 
were introduced. First, the state started to promote entrepreneurship. The 
initial success of some self-employed people motivated many others. Some 
people with public sector jobs also quit to enter the private sector. The idea 
was to carry out incremental reform so that people would be attracted to 
the private sector voluntarily. However, this approach did not achieve its 
intended results easily. People in the private sector soon learnt to appreciate 
the value of the state sector’s work-unit welfare system. The higher cash 
income in the private sector was not always good enough to make up for the 
loss of welfare benefits. Work-unit welfare became the bottleneck slowing 
down economic liberalisation (Wu and Xie 2003). It was also believed 
that unemployment was ultimately due to the oversupply of labourers. 
Therefore, the “One Child Policy” was introduced to reverse the population 
growth trend set by Mao. Furthermore, a social security system was set up 
to reduce the welfare burden of work units. The social insurance system 
required contributions by individuals and employers. A social insurance-
based pension system was also set up to help establish the social pooling 
of pension funds and break up the close linkage between employers and 
welfare. Finally, enterprises were required to gradually withdraw from 
providing social services. 
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In rural areas, as households took over social responsibilities from rural 
collectives, the collective social protection system was stopped. At the same 
time, organised development programmes were introduced to relieve rural 
poverty (Ngok 2010).
At the same time, political movements in the 1980s called for political 
democratisation. This was arguably a period in which reformers were 
opposed by leftists keen to preserve the socialist ideal and highly risk-
averse welfare systems. The leftists were reminded that they needed to be 
more open-minded and the public was taught to appreciate the advantages 
of a market economy. Politically, intellectuals were concerned about the 
possibility of a return to Mao’s style of government. Despite the reformer’s 
insistence that it would not be the case, some urban elites believed that 
without a democratically elected government, the return of a dictatorship 
could not be ruled out. Several waves of student movements in the 1980s, 
especially in 1989, reminded the Chinese leadership that the threat to 
party authority was real. For several years after 1989, the direction of 
reform remained unclear. In 1992, a speech given by Deng reassured that 
marketisation would continue. In hindsight, this was again an outcome 
of negotiations between the political left and right. Renouncing radical 
political changes, the reformers focused their attention on accelerating 
the economic transition. 
A housing provident fund was set up at the end of 1991 to help people 
to buy houses in the private market. At the same time, public rent levels 
were increased in order to push people out of the rental sector (Li 2005). 
The marketisation process was not smooth. The country experienced several 
rounds of inflation, which caused panic responses from the public. As a 
result, reforms in housing, price and labour contracts were put on hold 
several times and were only resumed when the economic situation improved. 
Welfare reform to support economic growth and the 
resulting political change (1992–2003)
Growth-oriented economic reform
When Jiang Zemin came into power with the support of Deng, economic 
reforms accelerated. The priority during this period was reforming state 
enterprises so that they could compete in the market in an increasingly 
open economy. State enterprises were pushed to the market at a much faster 
pace. After 1992, politicians championing market liberalisation were put 
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in top positions to ensure that the direction of economic reform was not 
reversed and that radical political reforms did not set in (Perry 1993). The 
central thrusts of reform in this period were to improve economic efficiency 
and open the economy more broadly to the world. However, some scholars 
began to worry that the rapid introduction of overseas competition would 
jeopardise the ability of Chinese enterprises to develop. They argued that 
despite the growing private sector, state and collective enterprises were 
still the largest employers in China. After long-standing state planning 
and control, Chinese enterprises and businessmen were not yet used to the 
challenge of global market competition. Newly emerging industries would 
need a transitional period so that they could grow before becoming full-
fledged competitors to foreign companies which had far more resources and 
better management skills (Leung 2003). Also, without setting up a social 
security system, Chinese enterprises, bearing the burden of welfare provision, 
would find it difficult to compete in the market. This line of argument was 
reinforced by the examples of the four Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore): these economies were export-oriented, yet the 
state played an important role in cultivating business competitiveness. Major 
export industries such as car manufacturing in South Korea were subsidised 
and supported by the state (Unger and Chan 1995). 
Nevertheless, state protection did not generate expected economic outputs 
and many state enterprises continued to run inefficiently. Increasingly, it 
became clear that the heavily subsidised state sector was sucking up scarce 
resources that were crucial for private sector growth. The overall costs of the 
distortion caused by the state might in the long run be bigger than the East 
European “Big Shock” (Fan 1994). Furthermore, the East Asian economic 
crises of the 1990s meant that affected countries had had to undertake painful 
economic restructuring. Such changes in the global economic climate helped 
China’s reformers to gain ground against the protectionists. At the same 
time, several rounds of negotiations at the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and World Trade Organization (WTO) put pressure on China to 
open its economy further. According to the WTO entry requirements, state 
enterprises would need to operate in the same way as private enterprises. To 
achieve this, Chinese state enterprises had to be reformed. These reforms 
involved the following aspects:
1. Life-time employment. Unemployment, still a politically sensitive 
term then, was expressed as a period of xiàgǎng (下岗), in which 
workers were laid off, but continued to receive welfare benefits from 
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former employers. To help people cope with the shock of xiagang, a 
social safety net with three protection mechanisms was adopted: a 
social insurance against unemployment; living allowances offered 
by the previous employers or the re-employment centres funded by 
the local government; and a minimum living standard guarantee 
for the unemployed. 
2. Pensions. In 1997, a basic pension insurance system to which 
enterprises and individuals would contribute towards was set up. 
It comprised a social pooling account and an individual account. 
Further changes were made in 2000, and the system is still in use 
today. 
3. Healthcare. In 1998, a basic health insurance scheme that involved 
employer and individual contributions emerged, where 30 per cent 
of contributions were put in an individual account and the rest were 
put in a social pooling account. At the same time, hospitals began 
to operate like private businesses. The idea was that competition 
would prompt hospitals to improve productivity.
4. Housing. In 1998, the employer housing provision was officially 
abandoned. New employees were expected to use the money they 
had accumulated in the housing provident funds or get bank loans 
to buy houses in the private market (Li and Gong 2003).
The supporting role of welfare policies can be observed in the changing 
spending patterns of the government. As shown in Table 1, the total 
government expenditure had dropped from about 30 per cent of GDP to 
11.7 per cent in 1997. The trend began to reverse from 1998 when radical 
reforms of the enterprises started. The amount spent on unemployment 
benefits accelerated in the following years. This was because as more workers 
became xiagang, government expenditure on education increased and its 
importance as a proportion of total expenditure began to drop after 1998, 
as a result of a policy to consolidate rural education and improve efficiency. 
At the same time, the importance of state spending on healthcare also 
declined in this period, matching progress in enterprise reform. However, 
it is important to note that the overall spending on the poor was marginal 
in comparison to other spending, showing the minimalistic approach to 
welfare and the intention to prevent welfare dependency.
These reforms helped to relieve the social burden taken on by state and 
collective enterprises. At the same time, the social insurance schemes required 
both employers and employees to contribute to the welfare entitlement of 
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Education
 
Unemployment
Benefits
 
Health Total Government
Expenditure (TGE)
GDP
100 million 
yuan
% of TGE 100 million 
yuan
% of TGE 100 million
yuan
% of TGE 100 million
Yuan
% of GDP 100 million 
yuan
1978       35.4 3.2 1122 30.8 3645
1979       40.6 3.2 1282 31.6 4063
1980       51.9 4.2 1229 27.0 4546
1981       59.7 5.2 1138 23.3 4892
1982       69.0 5.6 1230 23.1 5323
1983       77.6 5.5 1410 23.6 5963
1984       89.5 5.3 1701 23.6 7208
1985       107.7 5.4 2004 22.2 9016
1986       122.2 5.5 2205 21.5 10275
1987       127.3 5.6 2262 18.8 12059
1988       145.4 5.8 2491 16.6 15043
1989       167.9 5.9 2824 16.6 16992
1990       187.3 6.1 3084 16.5 18668
1991       204.1 6.0 3387 15.5 21781
1992 728.8 19.5   228.6 6.1 3742 13.9 26923
1993 867.8 18.7   272.1 5.9 4642 13.1 35334
1994 1174.7 20.3 5.1 0.1 342.3 5.9 5793 12.0 48198
1995 1411.5 20.7 8.2 0.1 387.3 5.7 6824 11.2 60794
1996 1671.7 21.1 13.9 0.2 461.6 5.8 7938 11.2 71177
1997 1862.5 20.2 18.7 0.2 523.6 5.7 9234 11.7 78973
1998 2032.5 18.8 20.4 0.2 590.1 5.5 10798 12.8 84402
1999 2287.2 17.3 31.9 0.2 641.0 4.9 13188 14.7 89677
2000 2562.6 16.1 56.2 0.4 709.5 4.5 15887 16.0 99215
2001 3057.0 16.2 83.3 0.4 800.6 4.2 18903 17.2 109655
2002 3491.4 15.8 116.8 0.5 908.5 4.1 22053 18.3 120333
2003 3850.6 15.6 133.4 0.5 1116.9 4.5 24650 18.1 135823
2004 4465.9 15.7 137.5 0.5 1293.6 4.5 28487 17.8 159878
2005 5161.1 15.2 132.4 0.4 1552.5 4.6 33930 18.3 184937
2006 6348.4 15.7 125.8 0.3 1778.9 4.4 40423 18.7 216314
2007 8280.2 16.6 129.4 0.3 2581.6 5.2 49781 18.7 265810
2008 10449.6 16.7 139.5 0.2 3593.9 5.7 62593 19.9 314045
2009 10437.5 13.7 145.8 0.2 3994.2 5.2 76300 22.4 340507
tABLe 1. SOCiAL exPeNDiture AND PerCeNtAge (%) OF tOtAL gOVerNMeNt exPeNDiture
Data source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
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the latter. This meant that if a person had a job and the employers were 
willing to sign up to the state social insurance schemes, he would be in a 
good position. However, this gradual social insurance reform did not try to 
integrate the different social insurance accounts. Adding all the accounts 
together, the total contribution as a proportion of a worker’s income became 
very high. A number of investigations carried out recently on income tax 
suggest that in the current contribution system, Chinese social security 
contribution has become one of the highest in the world (Qu 2011). Not 
all private employers are interested in participating in the schemes, and 
as the relevant legislation has yet to appear, it has been difficult to extend 
these social insurance schemes to the non-state sector. Therefore, for quite 
a long time, a large proportion of people working in the private sector and 
the unemployed have not been covered by the social insurance system. 
Another problem is the legacy of the planning system. As observed by many 
researchers (Logan et al. 2009; Ngok 2010; Logan et al. 1999), entitlements 
under the new welfare system in this period were still defined by status 
rather than by need, e.g., senior cadres enjoying better subsidies to larger 
houses and better healthcare coverage. This has contributed to a widening 
gap between the more resourceful and the less resourceful. 
During this period, rural welfare and social services were also reformed. 
For example, rural education was reshaped to improve education efficiency. 
Rural schools were merged and more concentrated in townships. This 
meant rural children had to leave their home villages or travel a long 
distance in order to attend school (Li and Piachaud 2004). A similar 
situation also occurred in the health sector. Following the reforms, rural 
cooperative healthcare collapsed and coverage of rural healthcare services 
also deteriorated. Chart 2 shows the rural-urban gap in terms of healthcare 
staff members per one thousand people.
On the whole, welfare reform in this period (1992–2003) was designed to 
support the reform of state enterprises and to improve economic efficiency. 
Measured by GDP growth, economic reforms during this period were indeed 
successful, and the government was keen to continue to pursue economic 
growth (see Chart 3). 
Political changes in response to social and economic changes
In his second term, Jiang Zemin introduced the “Three Represents” (sāngè 
dàibiǎo, 三个代表) concept into the Party Constitution. Signifying a turn 
towards capitalism, it meant that the Party now represented three priorities: 
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Economic Productivity, Cultural Development, and Political Consensus.1 
This change opened the Party membership to “capitalists”. In light of the 
economic situation in the 1990s, the Three Represents was also a way to 
ingratiate the Party with the increasingly powerful capitalist class. As a 
result of enterprise reforms, many state and collective enterprises were closed 
down. The state had to introduce large numbers of re-employment projects 
to relieve the tension caused by mass unemployment. However, ultimately, 
whether or not these people could escape the unemployment trap had very 
much to do with the availability of new employment opportunities. In a 
shrinking state and collective sector, it was not realistic to expect a massive 
increase in employment. New enterprises that were not in the traditional 
state and collective sectors became crucial to the economy (see Chart 4). 
Changing the Party Constitution was a way to acknowledge the importance 
of the newly emerging capitalist class, and to send a signal to the public 
that the Party was willing to represent all social classes. 
CHArt 2. MeDiCAL teCHNiCAL PerSONNeL iN HeALtH CAre iNStitutiONS 
 Per 1000 PeOPLe
Data source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
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From pro-growth to social harmony (2003–the Present)
Socio-economic changes 
In contrast to the earlier period in which efficiency was the only priority, 
the national development strategies shifted, from 2002, to “prioritising 
efficiency and giving consideration to fairness” in the 16th CPC National 
Congress Report (Jiang 2002). This change was influenced by several 
economic and political factors.
First, after China joined the WTO, it soon developed into the workshop 
of the world, in part because of its rich supply of cheap labour. In the past, 
however, rural workers had not officially been allowed to work in cities. 
They suffered from discrimination and could be evicted to the countryside 
or even arrested if caught working “illegally” in cities. This policy became 
increasingly unpopular. Apart from concerns regarding human and social 
rights, preventing rural workers from entering cities forced employers to 
hire workers on the black market. It increased the risks and labour costs of 
enterprises, and businesses which thrived on cheap labour were most affected.
CHArt 3. gDP Per CAPitA (1980–2003)
Data source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
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Second, the wealth accumulated by the successful ones did not trickle 
down. On the contrary, income inequality increased. The Gini coefficient 
increased to 4.5 in 2005. Both the rural-urban income gap and the urban 
income gap increased over time. Dissatisfaction became visible. Wang and 
Wei (2009) found that between 1988 and 2006, a period in which income 
inequality increased, there were clearly more criminal offenses. There were 
also numerous protests which were either suppressed or appeased. In 2003, 
the spread of the severe acute repiratory syndrome (SARS) also revealed 
weaknesses in the healthcare system (Claeson, Wang, and Hu 2004). 
Third, several long-term and structural problems demanded a more 
balanced approach towards economic development. As summarised by 
Zhang, Xu and Midgley (2007, 16–22):
(1) The increased social burden of an ageing society was the direct 
outcome of the “One Child Policy” introduced in the 1980s.
(2) When rural labourers moved to cities, only the elderly and young 
children were left in rural areas. The need for care increased 
dramatically. 
CHArt 4. NuMBer OF eMPLOyeeS By BuSiNeSS OwNerSHiP At yeAr-eND 
 (iN MiLLiONS)
Data source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
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(3) Cities suffered from a range of illnesses, including over-crowded 
housing, congested public transportation, high employment pressure, 
environmental pollution, greater social division and inequality, 
emergence of ghettos, shortage of water and energy, and higher 
crime rates. 
Fourth, the local government’s ability to raise local revenues by selling 
land use rights to real estate developers and businesses generated great 
incentives to demolish residential houses or take over land from rural 
villages. The booming housing market and the possibility of boosting GDP 
were further incentives to carry out urban regeneration. However, this 
created a strong sense of uncertainty and marginalisation among existing 
residents, particularly those who were opposed to the land use changes or 
felt that the compensation was inadequate. 
Pursuit of social harmony—a political turning point
Social policy reforms have played a much bigger part in this period. This 
was the first time since the 1980s that social welfare reforms were intended 
to improve the well-being of the people directly. This was a big contrast to 
earlier social welfare reforms designed to facilitate economic growth and 
state enterprise efficiency. The reason for such a move was that the social 
problems discussed earlier were becoming a serious threat to social stability. 
Greater social inequality was leading to a strong sense of resentment against 
the rich. Lu (2010) studied the survey of 2004 on social attitudes and found 
that even with improved social mobility, when income was controlled, 
people were still very negative about inequality. At the same time, people in 
both rural and urban areas had much higher confidence in the performance 
of the national economy than in their own life improvement. This meant 
that people felt that as the country became richer, they would not benefit 
as much as individuals (on a five-point scale, the gap between the two was 
greater than one) (Yuan and Zhang 2011). The dissatisfaction was also 
turning into action. Between 2002 and 2004, the number of collective 
action events—including protests, demonstrations, riots, and petitions 
(shàngfǎng, 上访)—had reached more than 40,000 per year. In 2005, that 
number reached 57,000, ten times more than 10 years before. The number 
continued to grow after that.
To cope with some of the above-mentioned pressures, social development 
was put high on the agenda when Hu Jintao came into power in 2003. A 
further elaboration was made in 2005 to bring forward a development 
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strategy aimed at maintaining social harmony. The relevant policies contain 
many elements. Culturally, there were efforts to restore Confucian values to 
society in order to improve a sense of cultural identity and placate public 
resentment. However, it seemed that without making solid steps to deal with 
social inequality, resorting to Confucian values would not be an effective 
tool to reduce social tensions. Economic policies were also introduced to 
develop the western provinces by carrying out major investments in the West. 
Politically, a fresh leadership style has been adopted by the government. 
The present leadership has tried to show that they are caring and listening 
to the people. They have made it a point to express condolences to the poor 
and those affected by natural disasters.
Social policy changes to enhance social harmony
A number of commentators believe that China has entered a period in 
which social policy has ceased to be used functionally as a tool to achieve 
economic goals. However, it is hard to separate politics from social goals 
completely. Not only has the timing of recent reforms matched growing 
social tensions, but the most immediate responses have also followed the 
loudest public outcries.
The first major move in this period has been the extension of the 
coverage of social insurance schemes. Not only have state enterprises 
offered social insurance to workers, but enterprises in the private sector have 
also been urged to make their contributions and administer the coverage. 
Workers and employers would jointly contribute to pension, unemployment, 
healthcare, childbirth, industrial accidents, and housing provident funds. 
The coverage is not limited to urban citizens. As part of the urbanisation 
strategy, migrant workers from rural areas have also been included partially in 
the social insurance schemes, though the contribution rate and entitlement 
are still different from those of urban citizens. Great efforts have also been 
made to enlarge the coverage of rural social insurance schemes. After some 
years of piloting, in 2009, a series of rural social protection schemes were 
formally introduced, including pensions, supporting single-elderly who 
did not have help from extended families, and minimum living standard 
provisions for rural households.
The second area is policies designed to help reduce rural and 
urban poverty. In 2004, three rural problems (farmers’ income, growth in 
agriculture and rural social stability) were brought under the spotlight. As a 
result, income from various agricultural activities has increased significantly 
after 2007 (see Chart 5). 
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Another important contributor to the reduction of rural poverty has 
been the opening up of the urban labour market to rural migrant workers. 
The initial idea was to unify the rural and urban labour markets and make 
it easier for migrant workers to take up jobs in cities. As shown in Chart 
6, the proportion of the Chinese population living in cities had jumped 
up from 2000 because of reduced labour mobility control. The pressures 
of urban industrial growth and service sector development have meant 
that the needs of migrant workers have to be addressed: both in terms 
of their basic needs as well as giving them a stronger sense of belonging 
in the urban environment. Consequently, urban social insurance and 
some social services such as schooling for migrants’ children have been 
made available to migrant workers. One important measure taken by the 
government has been to offer legal and social support for migrant workers. 
However, owing to various institutional constraints, progress in this area 
has been quite slow. 
Urbanisation and the abolition of the rural agricultural tax have helped 
to further reduce rural poverty and narrow the rural-urban income gap. 
However, as more poor people move to the cities, some rural poverty has 
been urbanised and the urban income gap has grown as a result (Ravallion, 
Chen, and Sangraula 2007). The numbers of collective protests and riots 
CHArt 5. HOuSeHOLD iNCOMeS FrOM AgriCuLture (Per CAPitAL, yuAN)
Data source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
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regarding land acquisition and labour rights, and crime rates increased 
more than ten-fold between 1993 and 2007 (Chen 2009). To calm down 
protesters, one-off cash payments and administrative powers have been 
used to fight the fire. For example, construction companies were pressured 
to pay their workers on time. Pension increases were paid to retired teachers 
in various cities. 
In urban areas, most cities have introduced a minimum living standard 
guarantee and unemployment benefits so that the short- and long-term 
unemployed or the disabled enjoy coverage. These groups are also entitled to 
various other benefits in schooling, healthcare and public housing. However, 
the entitlements and the generosity of provisions are locally determined 
and very much dependent on the prosperity of the city concerned (Solinger 
2008). 
The third area is healthcare system reform. This reform is still in 
progress and has had to face up to many challenges. Despite the improved 
health insurance coverage in both cities and rural villages, the public still 
feels that good quality healthcare is unaffordable and inaccessible. So far, 
the foci of reforms have been healthcare cost control and resolving the 
hostile relationship between doctors and patients. These demand more 
fundamental changes in hospital funding, management, pay structures 
CHArt 6. urBANiSAtiON rAte, PerCeNtAge (%) OF urBAN POPuLAtiON
Data source: China Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook, various issues
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and the monitoring of service suppliers. However, because hospitals have 
long been operating like profit-making businesses, the resistance to changes 
has been strong. 
The fourth main area is housing reform. The 1998 reform had 
successfully pushed people to buy homes and increased the home ownership 
rate dramatically. However, urban housing has become increasingly less 
affordable for ordinary wage earners. Young people, lower-income groups 
and migrant workers have found it difficult to afford houses in cities. They 
have ended up living in rented accommodations in urban villages and peri-
urban farm houses. A housing security system had been developed since 
1994, with three broad elements: subsidised home ownership; housing 
provident funds that people can borrow against with favourable terms; and 
low rent public housing for the poor and public rental housing at half the 
market price for newcomers to the local labour market. However, housing 
reform has always been controversial. The local governments had relied 
on land sales revenues to support its own spending. As a result, the costs 
of housing construction have been pushed up. What is more, driven by 
the lucrative urban housing bubbles, the scale of housing demolition has 
been unprecedented. 
Finally, the effects of the 2007 Financial Crisis that persist to this 
day have put a serious strain on China’s export businesses, with millions 
of migrant workers losing their jobs. To avoid a major recession, it was 
considered necessary to restructure the economy to reduce dependency 
on exports and boost domestic demand. At the same time, to avoid being 
weighed down by a sluggish economy, the government decided to invest 
a large amount of money as crisis relief funds to stimulate the economy. 
A large part of the money has gone into cheap rental housing and public 
housing schemes. The government planned to build 10 million flats in 
2011 with 1.3 trillion yuan in government funding support, and to spend 
36 million yuan within the 13th Five Year Plan period. 
Conclusion
This paper shows that since the Communist Party came into power in China, 
social welfare has been actively used by the state to boost economic growth 
and maintain social stability. In different periods, there were different 
priorities. Sometimes economic growth dominated and sometimes social 
concerns were brought to the fore. These changes also show that Chinese 
policymakers have taken a pragmatic approach and have embraced different 
changing perceptions of the relationship between economic growth, social 
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stability, and party authority. In this sense, despite changes in development 
strategy, welfare spending has been only a part of a broader strategy—to 
ensure the Communist Party would be accepted by the people.
Prioritising economic growth and social stability may have had some 
advantages in the sense that it required the government to be responsive 
to immediate threats. This has helped China to quickly build up various 
elements of a modern social security system in a short time. The new 
welfare system itself has had some limits. It focuses on contribution-based 
social insurance. The availability and quality of social services has still 
been poor. Entitlements are not yet portable between different provinces 
and it therefore remains difficult for migrant workers to be fully integrated 
into their new communities. The public finance system has yet to be sorted 
out and the central and local governments do not have a clear division of 
funding and service provision responsibilities. The patchy approach to 
reform also further blurs this division. It is difficult for policy enforcers 
not only to follow the policy changes, but also to assess the outcomes in 
terms of reducing inequality.
What is more, treating social welfare as a supporting tool to achieve 
political stability has its own problems. 
• On top of the social security infrastructure construction, there have 
been ad hoc pension increases for retired public sector employees, 
housing benefits, and public provision as a result of young people’s 
complaints about low housing affordability, eldercare centres for the 
dissatisfied retired soldiers, etc. All these handouts were meant to 
stop angry protestors. However, the handouts have also sent strong 
signals to the general public: that public display of resentment will 
lead to government compromises, thus inviting more protests. What 
is more, as society becomes more divided, the government may 
get trapped between different interest groups. For example, recent 
complaints about overcrowding cities have become louder than 
before. Urban residents have become unhappy about the inflow of 
migrants. Instead of trying to improve efficiency in the delivery of 
services, some cities have begun to limit migration and resorted to 
discriminatory policies that they had abandoned in the past. Such 
policies might now enjoy the support of the local population, but 
will come at a cost to the migrant population.
• These ad hoc changes have also made the already fragmented 
welfare benefits even more difficult to disentangle. There is now 
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greater difficulty in tracing the net benefits that a person might 
have received, and an overall loss of transparency. 
• To pacify public anger, the central government has been quick to 
make promises. However, the financial and implementation burdens 
tend to fall on the shoulders of the local government. The reality is, 
the local government may not necessarily agree with what the central 
government has promised, and this has resulted in unimplemented 
policies. This has caused confusion and frustration among the 
general public, leading to greater doubt about the government’s 
ability to govern and even causing them to question the sincerity 
of seemingly compassionate leaders. According to surveys carried 
out by the Lingdian Consultant on the indicators of life quality of 
Chinese residents, the confidence of the people in the government’s 
management ability reached its peak in 2009, but by 2010, had 
dropped significantly to pre-2007 levels (Yuan and Zhang 2011).
NOTE
1. In Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 16th CPC Congress (November 2002), the translation 
of the three priorities was slightly different. Economic Production was interpreted 
as “advanced social productive forces”; Cultural Development was “the progressive 
course of China’s advanced culture”; and Political Consensus was “the fundamental 
interests of the majority”. 
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